Below is a synopsis and brainstorming of a future paper regarding Kant's deontological ethics and his metaphysics in relation to a God proven through an S5 ontological argument
There is a theorem in logic in the S5 modality which runs thus:
N=Necessity operator and P (uppercase)=Possibility operator, let p (lowercase) be the proposition "God exists."
N(p-->Np) -->N (Pp-->p)
As this is a theorem it can be proved from itself, and cannot be refuted unless one does not accept S5 which is dangerous and unwise at is widely accepted because it works and is coherent. The argument continues:
1. N(p-->Np) It is necessary that if God exists, he necessarily exists. This is true because assuming God exist he cannot be a freak of nature nor an accident, otherwise we are not talking about the standard 3 O (ominpotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent) God.
2. N(Pp-->p) It is necessary that if it is possible that God exists then God exists. This follows by the logical rule of Modus Ponens from Premise 1 and the theorem.
3. Pp --> p This follows from premise 2 by the modal logical rule of necessitation
4. Pp It is possible that God exists. This is an assumption, and the only assumption of the argument, therefore it is the only point at which it must be attacked, namely, the atheist must show that such a God is impossible.
5. p God exists by Modus Ponens of 3 and 4.
Having established the existence of the divine by this ontological argument in symbolic logic, we must begin to reason about what such a being would have to do with morality. One dilemma we face is: Are things good because God wills them, or does God will them because they are good? These are not the same as Plato points out in the dialogue Euthyphro. If things are good because God wills them, then it seems God could have willed murder to be moral, if we say "well God couldn't do that because that's wrong" then we have just contradicted ourselves as apparently morality is not simply equal to God's commands. If it is the latter, God is less of a legislator and more of a perfectly good guide who points us to a higher morality. I favor more of the latter thought, and believe that a perfectly rational being such as God guides us towards a higher standard of morality. Through several pages I show that he points us towards the Categorical Imperative wherein rational beings must always treat rational beings as an ends, never solely as a means to an end. I go into a lengthy argument quoting ethicist Christine Korsgaard's argument for the Categorical Imperative as the supreme principle of morality.
I also contend that since God is good and the human being always wills some good even if he sometimes mistakenly goes about pursuing it that human beings always pursue God as a good end as I argued for earlier. We must cultivate virtues such as courage and temperance in order to properly order our reason towards not only a good end (God), but also how we must arrive there (properly motivated good deeds). These virtues can indeed be cultivated in the deontological sense as duties.
Adding to the existence of God through reason, I also claim direct experience of the divine in a real and mystical sense. I understand that this is not particularly good for persuading others who might not have had such an experience, but its ability to persuade is irrelevant. We often trust our own experiences completely, even if they could possibly be mistaken and these experiences often are not grounded in emotion. So I also argue that a reasoned belief in God can be prodded by a sort of direct experience and a gifting of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity by the holy spirit.
Sunday, July 3, 2011
Friday, May 20, 2011
A Counterexample to Rawls and Plato's Republic
In Plato’s Republic we find a description of a utopian society wherein the goal of the common good is enacted through meritocracy and an appeal to higher justice. With the abolishment of inherited wealth, the family unit, and the accrual of great amounts of wealth among individuals, an almost Marxist society is formed wherein each individual contributes according to his ability and receives according to his need. The question arises as to whether Plato’s society is truly just or if there are dire flaws within his utopian state which render it not only unworkable, but undesirable.
Plato’s case today, particularly regarding the taxation of inheritance is most strengthened by modern Rawslian and liberal arguments. Rawls proposed a so-called “veil of ignorance” for ethical decision making wherein an individual would not know whether he would be born rich or poor, in a first world country or a third-world country. In the words of Rawls: "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like"1 contends that an individual behind such a veil would desire a system of laws wherein the maximum amount of equity could be achieved. Applying Rawls’s argument, individuals would find it a moral imperative to stress higher taxes for the rich and distributing income more equitably without entirely destroying the incentive to work hard and innovate. Higher inheritance taxes to fund education and government welfare programs would also be a natural conclusion. Indeed, the inheritor of a vast fortune would seem to have many advantages over an individual born in a slum, none of which were earned through his merit but rather by circumstance of birth.
In many ways, the Rawlsian account of justice is satisfying and buttresses Platonic ideals of meritocracy and the equitable distribution of wealth. However, I have constructed below a counterexample for the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” and enforced equity that I feel Plato and Rawls both fail to sufficiently address as it involves a technology and science that is still on the cutting edge, genetic modification:
Imagine that our ability to modify the human genome has reached the point that we may genetically modify individuals to not only be economic and legal equals, but also intellectual and physical equals as well. Much like Kurt Vonnegut’s short story, "Harrison Bergeron", no one is more beautiful than another nor stronger than another. It would seem that arguments from the veil of ignorance would seem to indicate that since we do not know whether we would be born with great natural strength or intelligence, that if genetic modification were possible that we ought to ensure equitable genetic distribution of these traits.
One objection the Rawlsian or the Platonist could make is that such equitable distribution of talent through genetic means would ultimately lead to miserable results as we would lack naturally charismatic and intelligent “leaders” or brawny and courageous “soldiers” and therefore the distribution of talent would be immoral in a way that economic distribution would not be. This objection creates another problem, however, in that in our society of gene-modifiers we could simply modify humans for particular tasks along the same lines as an ant nest or beehive. We have soldiers bred for defense, leaders bred as philosopher-kings, and a worker cast bred for endurance, obedience, and skill. Although this society may function as a well ordered society, it would seem that we arrive once again at the original problem of success being based in birth rather than merit. Whether achieved by eugenics or direct genetic modification, it would seem that such a society satisfies the veil of ignorance but seems to be unjust and to interfere with autonomy and/or merit.
Another objection to my counterexample would be that such an experiment would be unethical from a standard independent of the veil of ignorance and is therefore frivolous. A position has been staked out by Rawlsian ethicists and contractarians that the Rawlsian ethical theory is solely designed to deal with interactions between individuals and other issues such as crimes against the self are the proper demesne of other ethical theories. Certain neo-Kantians have proposed out a similar position wherein their theory is designed to cover only moral actions involving rational agents and that actions towards infants, invalids, and animals, among other non-rational agents must be dealt with using other ethical theories. This objection is a much stronger one, but it still fails for similar reasons in that the veil of ignorance seems to justify the above genetic modification and that if some other theory, such as a Kantian one, declares such modification impermissible then we must ask two questions,:
1.) Why not choose to follow the latter theory rather than the Rawlsian veil of ignorance?
2.) If both rules are employed, how is meta-rule crafted so as to not render the veil of ignorance moribund?
Plato’s notion of the “noble lie” is another troubling aspect of his society and justice. Socrates contends that although such a lie, a national myth designed to create an ordered society, were literally false, a great harmony would result between the various parts of society. Although the term “noble lie” does not appear in Jowett the original Greek seems to point towards a gennaion pseudos. Philosopher Leo Strauss, who has gone on to heavily influence the American neo-conservative movement with his political thought, is an example of a modern advocate for a “noble lie” to promote an ordered state. In The City and Man, Strauss discusses the myths outlined in Plato's Republic that are required for all governments. These include a belief that the state's land belongs to it even though it was likely acquired through illegitimate means such as guile or conquest and that citizenship is rooted in something more than mere accident of birth.
There are multiple issues with Plato’s noble lie. The first is that deception for the purpose of an ordered and happy society seems to promote unjust results. One can imagine an example of being a sheriff in 1920s Mississippi when a series of rapes occurs. The townsfolk form a riotous mob and convene outside demanding that you as the sheriff hand over one of the prisoners, an African-American named Jones to be hung for committing these rapes. You know for a fact that Jones has an alibi for all of these rapes as he has been incarcerated in the town jail cell the whole time. You also know that if you fail to hand over Jones to be lynched a race riot will occur causing massive amounts of property destruction and a loss of multiple human lives. It would seem that if one handed over Jones and despite being innocent he was consequently executed, that one would commiting an unjust action by one’s moral intuitions. However, being that this lie promoted order (for this example let us assume that no more rapes occur) and promoted the greater good at the cost of only one life, it would seem justifiable as a noble lie if the appeal to order and happiness is what is truly required for a lie to be “noble”, if indeed any lie could be “noble”.
A second, far larger, problem with the noble lie is that philosophy is inherently an enterprise which seeks truth and eschews all falsehood. In a society built around philosophy and ruled by philosopher kings, it would seem that an incredibly schizophrenic society would result wherein the aims of the society are in effect contrary to what keeps it together. Philosopher kings would be hard-pressed to remain coherent and consistent when promoting both the national mythos and appealing to reasoned, grounded beliefs in logos. It would seem that rather than a society ruled by Socrates we would have a society of Callicles wherein deception and rhetoric and the triumph of strength and order have outweighed the philosophical enterprise.
This also seems to weaken the Reublic as a metaphor for the soul as if the metaphor is taken relatively literally the soul would also find itself in a schizophrenic state between truth seeking and a comfortable self deception and delusion. Although this seems to be an accurate depiction of the human soul, it is hardly a desirable end result and in looking for the well ordered soul it would seem that we must also look elsewhere.
Although Plato’s Republic seems to be a utopian and just society, governed by philosophy, beneath its veneer it seems to have a questionable ethical model and an even more questionable aim. Notions of enforced equitability run into problems when science renders man on the cusp of being able to manipulate natural talent as well as economic circumstance. The noble lie calls into question the whole philosophical nature of the Republic and renders it a schizophrenic society unable to decide between truth and order. Such a state is not only unworkable, as it must inevitably choose a side between truth/philosophy and deception/order but ultimately undesirable as philosophy cannot desire deception as an end without losing it’s purpose, that of truth-finding.
Plato’s case today, particularly regarding the taxation of inheritance is most strengthened by modern Rawslian and liberal arguments. Rawls proposed a so-called “veil of ignorance” for ethical decision making wherein an individual would not know whether he would be born rich or poor, in a first world country or a third-world country. In the words of Rawls: "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like"1 contends that an individual behind such a veil would desire a system of laws wherein the maximum amount of equity could be achieved. Applying Rawls’s argument, individuals would find it a moral imperative to stress higher taxes for the rich and distributing income more equitably without entirely destroying the incentive to work hard and innovate. Higher inheritance taxes to fund education and government welfare programs would also be a natural conclusion. Indeed, the inheritor of a vast fortune would seem to have many advantages over an individual born in a slum, none of which were earned through his merit but rather by circumstance of birth.
In many ways, the Rawlsian account of justice is satisfying and buttresses Platonic ideals of meritocracy and the equitable distribution of wealth. However, I have constructed below a counterexample for the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” and enforced equity that I feel Plato and Rawls both fail to sufficiently address as it involves a technology and science that is still on the cutting edge, genetic modification:
Imagine that our ability to modify the human genome has reached the point that we may genetically modify individuals to not only be economic and legal equals, but also intellectual and physical equals as well. Much like Kurt Vonnegut’s short story, "Harrison Bergeron", no one is more beautiful than another nor stronger than another. It would seem that arguments from the veil of ignorance would seem to indicate that since we do not know whether we would be born with great natural strength or intelligence, that if genetic modification were possible that we ought to ensure equitable genetic distribution of these traits.
One objection the Rawlsian or the Platonist could make is that such equitable distribution of talent through genetic means would ultimately lead to miserable results as we would lack naturally charismatic and intelligent “leaders” or brawny and courageous “soldiers” and therefore the distribution of talent would be immoral in a way that economic distribution would not be. This objection creates another problem, however, in that in our society of gene-modifiers we could simply modify humans for particular tasks along the same lines as an ant nest or beehive. We have soldiers bred for defense, leaders bred as philosopher-kings, and a worker cast bred for endurance, obedience, and skill. Although this society may function as a well ordered society, it would seem that we arrive once again at the original problem of success being based in birth rather than merit. Whether achieved by eugenics or direct genetic modification, it would seem that such a society satisfies the veil of ignorance but seems to be unjust and to interfere with autonomy and/or merit.
Another objection to my counterexample would be that such an experiment would be unethical from a standard independent of the veil of ignorance and is therefore frivolous. A position has been staked out by Rawlsian ethicists and contractarians that the Rawlsian ethical theory is solely designed to deal with interactions between individuals and other issues such as crimes against the self are the proper demesne of other ethical theories. Certain neo-Kantians have proposed out a similar position wherein their theory is designed to cover only moral actions involving rational agents and that actions towards infants, invalids, and animals, among other non-rational agents must be dealt with using other ethical theories. This objection is a much stronger one, but it still fails for similar reasons in that the veil of ignorance seems to justify the above genetic modification and that if some other theory, such as a Kantian one, declares such modification impermissible then we must ask two questions,:
1.) Why not choose to follow the latter theory rather than the Rawlsian veil of ignorance?
2.) If both rules are employed, how is meta-rule crafted so as to not render the veil of ignorance moribund?
Plato’s notion of the “noble lie” is another troubling aspect of his society and justice. Socrates contends that although such a lie, a national myth designed to create an ordered society, were literally false, a great harmony would result between the various parts of society. Although the term “noble lie” does not appear in Jowett the original Greek seems to point towards a gennaion pseudos. Philosopher Leo Strauss, who has gone on to heavily influence the American neo-conservative movement with his political thought, is an example of a modern advocate for a “noble lie” to promote an ordered state. In The City and Man, Strauss discusses the myths outlined in Plato's Republic that are required for all governments. These include a belief that the state's land belongs to it even though it was likely acquired through illegitimate means such as guile or conquest and that citizenship is rooted in something more than mere accident of birth.
There are multiple issues with Plato’s noble lie. The first is that deception for the purpose of an ordered and happy society seems to promote unjust results. One can imagine an example of being a sheriff in 1920s Mississippi when a series of rapes occurs. The townsfolk form a riotous mob and convene outside demanding that you as the sheriff hand over one of the prisoners, an African-American named Jones to be hung for committing these rapes. You know for a fact that Jones has an alibi for all of these rapes as he has been incarcerated in the town jail cell the whole time. You also know that if you fail to hand over Jones to be lynched a race riot will occur causing massive amounts of property destruction and a loss of multiple human lives. It would seem that if one handed over Jones and despite being innocent he was consequently executed, that one would commiting an unjust action by one’s moral intuitions. However, being that this lie promoted order (for this example let us assume that no more rapes occur) and promoted the greater good at the cost of only one life, it would seem justifiable as a noble lie if the appeal to order and happiness is what is truly required for a lie to be “noble”, if indeed any lie could be “noble”.
A second, far larger, problem with the noble lie is that philosophy is inherently an enterprise which seeks truth and eschews all falsehood. In a society built around philosophy and ruled by philosopher kings, it would seem that an incredibly schizophrenic society would result wherein the aims of the society are in effect contrary to what keeps it together. Philosopher kings would be hard-pressed to remain coherent and consistent when promoting both the national mythos and appealing to reasoned, grounded beliefs in logos. It would seem that rather than a society ruled by Socrates we would have a society of Callicles wherein deception and rhetoric and the triumph of strength and order have outweighed the philosophical enterprise.
This also seems to weaken the Reublic as a metaphor for the soul as if the metaphor is taken relatively literally the soul would also find itself in a schizophrenic state between truth seeking and a comfortable self deception and delusion. Although this seems to be an accurate depiction of the human soul, it is hardly a desirable end result and in looking for the well ordered soul it would seem that we must also look elsewhere.
Although Plato’s Republic seems to be a utopian and just society, governed by philosophy, beneath its veneer it seems to have a questionable ethical model and an even more questionable aim. Notions of enforced equitability run into problems when science renders man on the cusp of being able to manipulate natural talent as well as economic circumstance. The noble lie calls into question the whole philosophical nature of the Republic and renders it a schizophrenic society unable to decide between truth and order. Such a state is not only unworkable, as it must inevitably choose a side between truth/philosophy and deception/order but ultimately undesirable as philosophy cannot desire deception as an end without losing it’s purpose, that of truth-finding.
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1971. ISBN: 0-674-00078-1
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