Proof of God and God's Relation to Morality

 Below is a synopsis and brainstorming of a future paper regarding Kant's deontological ethics and his metaphysics in relation to a God proven through an S5 ontological argument

There is a theorem in logic in the S5 modality which runs thus:
N=Necessity operator and P (uppercase)=Possibility operator, let p (lowercase) be the proposition "God exists."

N(p-->Np) -->N (Pp-->p)

As this is a theorem it can be proved from itself, and cannot be refuted unless one does not accept S5 which is dangerous and unwise at is widely accepted because it works and is coherent. The argument continues:

1. N(p-->Np) It is necessary that if God exists, he necessarily exists. This is true because assuming God exist he cannot be a freak of nature nor an accident, otherwise we are not talking about the standard 3 O (ominpotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent) God.

2. N(Pp-->p) It is necessary that if it is possible that God exists then God exists. This follows by the logical rule of Modus Ponens from Premise 1 and the theorem.

3. Pp --> p This follows from premise 2 by the modal logical rule of necessitation

4. Pp It is possible that God exists. This is an assumption, and the only assumption of the argument, therefore it is the only point at which it must be attacked, namely, the atheist must show that such a God is impossible.

5. p God exists by Modus Ponens of 3 and 4.

Having established the existence of the divine by this ontological argument in symbolic logic, we must begin to reason about what such a being would have to do with morality. One dilemma we face is: Are things good because God wills them, or does God will them because they are good? These are not the same as Plato points out in the dialogue Euthyphro. If things are good because God wills them, then it seems God could have willed murder to be moral, if we say "well God couldn't do that because that's wrong" then we have just contradicted ourselves as apparently morality is not simply equal to God's commands. If it is the latter, God is less of a legislator and more of a perfectly good guide who points us to a higher morality. I favor more of the latter thought, and believe that a perfectly rational being such as God guides us towards a higher standard of morality. Through several pages I show that he points us towards the Categorical Imperative wherein rational beings must always treat rational beings as an ends, never solely as a means to an end. I go into a lengthy argument quoting ethicist Christine Korsgaard's argument for the Categorical Imperative as the supreme principle of morality.

I also contend that since God is good and the human being always wills some good even if he sometimes mistakenly goes about pursuing it that human beings always pursue God as a good end as I argued for earlier. We must cultivate virtues such as courage and temperance in order to properly order our reason towards not only a good end (God), but also how we must arrive there (properly motivated good deeds). These virtues can indeed be cultivated in the deontological sense as duties.

Adding to the existence of God through reason, I also claim direct experience of the divine in a real and mystical sense. I understand that this is not particularly good for persuading others who might not have had such an experience, but its ability to persuade is irrelevant. We often trust our own experiences completely, even if they could possibly be mistaken and these experiences often are not grounded in emotion. So I also argue that a reasoned belief in God can be prodded by a sort of direct experience and a gifting of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity by the holy spirit.